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COGNITIVE BIAS, THE “BAND OF EXPERTS,” AND
THE ANTI-LITIGATION NARRATIVE
Elizabeth Thornburg*
INTRODUCTION
It must be daunting to have the power to amend the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, especially when considering the discovery rules.
Dogged by conflicting arguments that the procedural system is dys-
functional, rulemakers are faced with a host of difficult decisions.
Some are normative.  For example, in assessing the cost of process,
how much cost is too much cost?  Others are empirical but devilishly
difficult to assess.  For example: (1) How do litigation costs compare
to monetary and nonmonetary stakes? (2) Would a rule change im-
pede the successful assertion of valid claims? and (3) What impact
would lessening private enforcement through litigation have on socie-
tal compliance with legal norms?  Even for variables that can be mea-
sured, empirical research sometimes provides answers that the
rulemakers simply do not believe.  Faced with these challenges, it is
not surprising that members of the Advisory Committee1 on the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure often fall back on opinion surveys that
are consistent with its members’ own political views and professional
experiences.
Professor Richard Marcus, Associate Reporter for the Advisory
Committee, has suggested it acts as a “Band of Experts.”  In this role,
“a small number of knowledgeable and experienced individuals iden-
tify the first principles and work out what procedures should be
* Richard R. Lee Endowed Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure begin with the Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), which transmits its recommendations to the Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee).  The Standing Committee
independently reviews the findings of the Advisory Committee and if satisfied, recommends
changes to the Judicial Conference, which in turn recommends changes to the Supreme Court.
The Court considers the proposals and, if it concurs, officially promulgates the revised rules by
order before May 1, to take effect no earlier than December 1 of the same year unless Congress
enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the pending rules.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012).
This Article refers to the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee collectively as the Rules
Committees. See generally How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. Courts, http://www.us
courts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited
Mar. 8, 2016).
755
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 2  2-AUG-16 10:02
756 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:755
adopted to accomplish them.”2  It is understandable that Advisory
Committee members would like to see themselves in that light, but
this idealization of the rulemakers’ role can lead to a false sense of
neutrality and omniscience.  Moreover, recent “Bands” have made
rulemaking choices that consistently favor corporate interests in the
gradual, but inexorable, quest to limit discovery.
This may be politics consciously in action; rulemakers may be com-
mitted to systemic changes that result in less regulation of business
through less effective private litigation.  Many recent amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be consistent with that
philosophy.  Even if that is not the case, sincerity does not create some
kind of neutral Socratic template for procedural choices.  No matter
how knowledgeable and experienced Committee members may be, in-
dividually and collectively they lack the ability to arrive at first princi-
ples that do not favor one type of litigant over another.  First, the
principles that underlie civil procedure are in tension with each other,
such that most changes will redistribute procedural advantages.  Sec-
ond, the Chief Justice’s appointment choices have resulted in Rules
Committee leadership and membership that is overly homogeneous
and inclined toward a particular type of political perspective and liti-
gation experience.3  Third, pressure on the Rules Committees—in-
cluding the Supreme Court’s own discourse about discovery,
corporate lobbying, and communications from Congress—undermines
any sense of viewpoint neutrality.  And, fourth, Rules Committee
members, as normal human beings, are operating under the combined
influence of a decades-long anti-litigation lobbying effort reinforced
by a collection of heuristic biases that tend to make them both overly
sensitive to corporate complaints and underappreciative of the con-
cerns of litigants who need discovery to gain access to information
that is crucial to their cases.
Cognitive psychologists have long researched the limits of human
minds, including psychological phenomena that make us unaware of
our own limits.  These heuristic biases cause us to draw flawed infer-
ences based on incomplete and unevenly weighted sources of informa-
tion.  Phenomena such as the availability heuristic and confirmation
bias can lead us to see and believe some claims and fail to see, or to
credit, others.  Worse, the operation of these heuristics is affected by
the experiences and beliefs of the person making decisions, so a Band
2. Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of Perfecting Pro-
cedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 112 (2007).
3. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Re-
form: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1159, 1571–76 (2015).
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of Experts with similar backgrounds and beliefs will tend to reinforce
rather than challenge each other’s biases.
Part II of this Article uses the December 2015 discovery rule
amendments as a case in point, highlighting the ways in which the
changes will tend to favor the interests of large entities resisting dis-
covery.4  This Part also argues that the amendments are not reasona-
bly calculated to accomplish their stated goals, thus supporting a fear
that they are either purposely crafted to limit litigation or based on a
mistaken view of federal litigation realities.  First, the amendments
claimed to be aimed at controlling excessive costs in the small percent-
age of large cases in which they occur, but the changes included in the
amended rules are unlikely to affect those cases.  Second, the Advi-
sory and Standing Committees’ expressed justifications for the rule
amendments relied heavily on opinion surveys while discounting more
reliable closed-case data and the recommendation of the Federal Judi-
cial Center’s (FJC) own empirical experts.
The remaining Parts of the Article ask why this would be true: Why
do the December 2015 rule amendments consistently favor discovery
resisters over discovery seekers? Part III examines the influence of
the Supreme Court itself in shaping the composition of the committee
and providing rhetorical signals about the role of discovery and of civil
litigation more generally.5  This Part concludes by noting other
sources of political pressure that lurk in the background of the Rule
Committees’ work.  Pressure like this is not surprising in light of the
political implications of decisions that impact whether, and to what
extent, the courts and lawsuits effectively enforce legal norms.  Part
IV describes the contours of the extremely effective, decades-long
public relations campaign designed to convince all of us that litigation
is pathologically abusive.6  Part V explores the ways in which predict-
able heuristic effects blind the Band of Experts to the possibilities of
solutions that would expand, rather than contract, information
sharing.7
4. See infra notes 8–34 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra notes 35–55 and accompanying text. R
6. See infra notes 56–86 and accompanying text. R
7. See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. R
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II. HELPING THE “HAVES”8 AGAIN: THE 2015
DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS
The Advisory Committee claims that the 2015 discovery amend-
ments arise out of the “Duke Conference,” a May 2010 invitation-only
meeting sponsored by the Advisory Committee, at which panels ad-
dressed assumed issues of cost and delay.  That description of the
provenance of the amendments is true to some extent, but the report
to the Chief Justice after the Duke Conference did not call for rule
change.  “The extent of the actual change effected by [the 2000
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1)] continues to be debated.  But there was
no demand at the Conference for a change to the rule language; there
is no clear case for present reform.”9  In addition, the Duke Confer-
ence itself resulted, in part, from ongoing pressure from corporate
America to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed.  For example, a power-
ful group of defense interests submitted a White Paper to the Duke
Conference with a discovery-curtailment wish list.  Lawyers for Civil
Justice (LCJ),10 DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar, the Federation
of Defense and Corporate Counsel, and the International Association
of Defense Counsel asked the Advisory Committee to:
• incorporate the proportionality factors into the definition of rele-
vance, coupled with an amendment of the proportionality factors,
which would make clear that discovery costs should be considered
excessive if they are not proportional to the claims at issue;
• redefine the scope of discovery to eliminate “subject matter” rele-
vance; and
• impose the costs of discovery on the discovering party: “A party
submitting a request for discovery is required to pay the reasona-
ble costs incurred by a party responding to a discovery request
. . . .  Such costs include the costs of preserving, collecting, review-
8. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103–04 (1974); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the
“Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 249–62
(1999) (critiquing the discovery amendments that went into effect in 2000 because they created a
one-sided advantage that favors defendants over plaintiffs).
9. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 8 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjus
ticepdf.
10. On its website, LCJ explains that it “promotes the corporate and defense perspective on
proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and works proactively to achieve
specific rule reforms by galvanizing corporate and defense practitioners and legal scholars to
offer consensus proposals to the rule makers.” LAW. FOR CIV. JUST., http://www.lfcj.com (last
visited Jan. 11, 2016).
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ing and producing electronic and paper documents, producing
witnesses for deposition and responding to interrogatories.”11
The 2015 discovery rule amendments include significant changes in
these areas and bear strong resemblances to this corporate wish list.
The changes: (1) incorporate the proportionality factors into the defi-
nition of relevance; (2) eliminate “subject matter” relevance; and (3)
tiptoe in the direction of shifting discovery costs to the discovering
party.
A. “Proportionality” as a Tool To Limit Discovery
If there is a single word that captures the branding of the amend-
ments to the discovery rules it is “proportionality.”12  In the abstract,
the concept sounds benign—who would argue in favor of dispropor-
tionate discovery?  More seems to be at work in the discovery amend-
ments, however.  Admonitions promoting proportionality have been
explicitly included in Rule 26 since 1983, they were broadened in 1993,
and the fear that parties and judges were failing to implement those
principles brought about an explicit cross-reference to those rules in
the 2000 discovery amendments.  No one could have overlooked their
existence.  Nevertheless, the 2015 amendments incorporated the pro-
portionality principles into the very definition of discovery relevance.
The call for proportionality arises out of a belief that discovery costs
are consistently too high, but that belief is contrary to reliable empiri-
cal data.  There is, in fact, evidence that costs in most cases are both
modest and proportional.  One might infer from this that the existing
proportionality provision is working or that there was never a prob-
lem to begin with.
Closed case data paints a different picture from the Committee’s
claims of runaway costs. The FJC’s careful 2009 study of thousands of
closed cases found that at the median the reported cost of discovery,
including attorneys’ fees, was just 1.6% of case stakes for plaintiffs
and only 3.3% for defendants.  These findings are consistent with ear-
lier empirical studies of discovery costs.  A RAND study of practice
after the 1993 amendments, for example, revealed that lawyer work
hours on discovery were zero for “38% of general civil cases and low
11. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO KEY
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23–24, 56 (May 2, 2010) [hereinafter LCJ WHITE PAPER], http://
www.uscourts.gov/file/document/reshaping-rules-civil-procedure-21st-century-need-clear-con
cise-and-meaningful.
12. Although the Advisory Committee also listed the promotion of cooperation among liti-
gants and early case management as goals, rule changes to promote these goals were, in fact,
quite modest.
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for the majority of cases.”13  A parallel FJC study found that the me-
dian reported proportion of discovery costs to stakes was 3% and that
the proportion of litigation costs attributable to problems with discov-
ery was about 4%.14
As the Advisory Committee noted in explaining its rule changes,
studies have also consistently shown that a very small percentage of
cases—between 5%–10%—do generate high-discovery costs.  Refer-
ring to the unquantified incidence of these cases as “worrisome,” the
Committee also accurately pointed out that the high-discovery cases
tend to be “complex, involve high stakes, and generate contentious
adversary behavior.”15  Law firm economics also have an important
impact on litigation costs.  When other variables are controlled for,
law firm size alone can more than double discovery costs, and hourly
billing also tends to raise costs.16
Those in attendance at the Duke Conference witnessed the disbelief
among corporate panelists of the closed-case numbers.  Those num-
bers, although supported by a long line of earlier studies, were incon-
sistent with the “cost and delay” narrative that they have internalized
after years of repetition.17  The Advisory and Standing Committees,
too, have tended to focus on opinion surveys that are not grounded in
actual costs, and those surveys disproportionately represent the com-
plaints of corporate and defense interests.  These opinions are quite
likely skewed, consciously or unconsciously, by the self-interest of the
13. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1998).  Although discovery costs grow with
the size and complexity of the case, the proportion of total costs they represent does not dramat-
ically increase: the median percent of discovery hours for the bottom 75%, top 25%, and top
10% of cases by hours worked were 25%, 33%, and 36% respectively. Id. at 639–40, 650
tbl.2.10.
14. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under
the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1998).  See PAUL R. CON-
NOLLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS:
DISCOVERY 1–2 (June 1978); WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM 71 tbl.6, 73, 196 tbl.49 (1968); and Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 790 (1998), for summaries of the
results of earlier studies.
15. Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Jeffrey
S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 8, 2013 as supplemented June
2013), reprinted in COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 259, 265 (2013) [hereinafter Rule Memorandum],
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/files/2013/11/Published-Rules-Package-Civil-Rules-Only.pdf.
16. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 784 (2010).
17. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1091–92 (2012).
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person surveyed and are also likely to be impacted by the ways in
which litigation and its costs have been portrayed in the media for
decades.18  Nevertheless, these self-proving complaints have found a
receptive ear, and the Advisory Committee informed the Standing
Committee that “[t]he previous amendments have not had their de-
sired effect.”19
What, then, changed in December 2015?  Under amended Rule
26(b)(1), the definition of discovery relevance reads like this:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the impor-
tance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the bur-
den or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.20
Note that this amendment may well leave discovery costs untouched
in the “worrisome” cases because those cases tend to involve situa-
tions in which costs are high but not disproportionate.  Nor is it clear
how the changes, if they merely relocate existing standards, are sup-
posed to decrease costs unless one believes that the judges overseeing
contentious, high-stakes litigation were unaware of the presence of
the factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(c).  The Advisory Committee commenda-
bly abandoned the parts of its original proposal that would have low-
ered the presumptive limits on depositions and interrogatories, and
these numbers (six depositions and fifteen interrogatories) were so
low that they were clearly never aimed at complex high-stakes
litigation.
Make no mistake: this change is intended to decrease the volume of
discovery and not just in the “worrisome” cases.  Nor is proportional-
ity analysis intended merely to winnow out discovery of marginally
relevant information.  Rather, as Professor Marcus noted, a “tricky
but central problem is to determine when discovery that seems ‘rea-
sonable’ in terms of providing needed evidence is nonetheless too
18. See infra notes 56–86 and accompanying text (examining media depictions). R
19. Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure B-8
(June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18218/download.
20. Id. at B-5.  In response to comments, the Advisory Committee did move the “importance
of the issues” factor to the front and added the factor about the parties’ relative access to rele-
vant information. See id.  The rule amendments as adopted added a Committee Note clarifying
that discovering parties do not bear the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.
Id. at B-39.
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costly or burdensome given the small stakes involved.”21  Analogizing
this issue to the English debates related to cost-shifting, Marcus
pointed to Lord Justice Jackson’s recent conclusion: “Disproportion-
ate costs do not become proportionate because they were necessary
. . . .  The fact that it was necessary to incur certain costs in order to
prove or disprove a head of claim is obviously relevant, but it is not
decisive of the question whether such costs were proportionate.”22  As
Marcus astutely pointed out, “American judges will increasingly be
called upon to make such judgments in deciding what discovery
should be ordered.”23
The ultimate impact of this rule change will only slowly be revealed
as discovery disputes arise. That impact may stay largely under the
radar because published opinions will be rare, discovery opinions are
very case-specific, and the incidence of unmade requests will be hard
to determine.  Judges will have discretion to apply balancing factors
and decide what is proportionate, and those decisions will require the
judges to evaluate what the probable out-of-pocket costs of the pro-
posed discovery would be and the importance of the litigation.  In
considering the worth of the requested discovery, judges will also need
to consider how significant or convincing they find the information
being sought.  Ultimately, the proportionality balance will require
normative decisions.24  Who will be the opinion leaders in this effort?
Duke University School of Law’s Judicial Center Advisory Council
(whose membership is numerically slanted in favor of corporations
(12) and defense lawyers (5) over plaintiffs’ lawyers (5))25 held an in-
vitation-only conference in November 2014 (under Chatham House
rules), with the ultimate goal of developing a “best-practices docu-
21. Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1719 (2014).
22. Id. at 1720 (quoting RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL RE-
PORT 37 (2009)); see also ENG. CIV. P.R. 44.3(2)(a) (“Costs which are disproportionate in
amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred
. . . .”).
23. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1721. R
24. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in
Discovery 13 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 1521,
2014), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1521.
25. The Council includes general counsel or litigators from Altec, Inc., Bank of America,
Bayer Corporation, Boston Scientific Corporation, Crawford and Company, ExxonMobil, GE’s
Power & Water, Home Depot, Merck, Microsoft, Pfizer, Inc., and State Farm Insurance Com-
pany, plus partners from ten major law firms (evenly split between plaintiff and defense prac-
tices). See Advisory Counsel: Duke Law Distinguished Lawyers Series: General Counsels,
Litigation Department Heads, and Law Firm Partners, DUKE L., http://law.duke.edu/judicialstud
ies/conferences/advisorycouncil (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 9  2-AUG-16 10:02
2016] THE ANTI-LITIGATION NARRATIVE 763
ment, which [would] provide authoritative guidance on implementing
the proportionality standard.”26
B. Eliminating “Subject Matter” Relevance
The rule amendments also narrowed the definition of discovery rel-
evance in another way: they removed the option to seek judicial ap-
proval of discovery that goes beyond the “claims and defenses”
pleaded by the parties.  Eliminating the category of “subject matter”
relevance not only narrows discovery but also leaves the unclear
“claims and defenses” language as the only test.27  The meaning of
that language, which its drafters always conceded to be murky, has
become all the more unclear because of the uncertainty about plead-
ings created by the Supreme Court’s opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly28 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.29  A party resisting discovery has
every incentive to object to the discovery of anything broader than the
narrowest pleaded facts, claiming that “conclusions” do not count as
“claims” for discovery relevance just as they are ignored in assessing
the adequacy of complaints.
The Advisory Committee discussions leading up to this set of dis-
covery rule amendments demonstrated that some judicial members of
the Committee already imposed limits on discovery that were even
more stringent than the proposals.  For example, the Briefing Book
for the November 7–8, 2013 meeting included Judge Paul Grimm’s
standard discovery order.  That order limits initial discovery to mate-
rial that is admissible in evidence, potentially followed by a second
phase of “relevant to the claims and defenses” discovery—only on a
showing of good cause.  Further, “[i]f the Court determines that addi-
tional discovery is appropriate, the Requesting Party will be required to
show cause why it should not be ordered to pay all or a part of the cost
26. Implementing Discovery Proportionality Standard Conference (Invitation Only), DUKE L.,
https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/november2014 (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
27. The drafters of the 2000 amendments explained that the standard was meant to be flexi-
ble.  “[T]he actual scope of discovery should be determined according to the reasonable needs of
the action.  The court may permit broader discovery in a particular case depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery
requested.”  Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 34 (May 18, 1998), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-pro
cedure-may-1998.  Plaintiffs and defendants also have predictably divergent views as to how
broadly or narrowly claims and defenses should be interpreted. See Thornburg, supra note 8, at R
255–58.
28. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
29. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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of the additional discovery sought.”30  This approach was cited in the
2010 defense bar White Paper,31 and it would not be surprising if fu-
ture amendment proposals raise this possibility once again.
C. Cost Shifting
Another antidiscovery provision is located in Rule 26(c)’s new per-
mission to shift the cost of discovery to the discovering party.  Cur-
rently cost shifts are rare, occurring mostly in e-discovery of material
that is not reasonably accessible.  Cost shifting more generally would
be a fundamental change in discovery philosophy and practice.  Al-
though the Advisory Committee Notes emphasize that these shifts
should not be the norm,32 the result will surely be to encourage parties
to request, and judges to allocate, costs to the discovering party more
frequently.
D. Summary
Cumulatively, the discovery rule amendments are likely to decrease
the sharing of information.  This impact is not aimed at, and will not
primarily affect, the large “worrisome” cases.  Rather, the decrease
will be felt most strongly by individuals and small businesses suing
large entities.  When those “one shot players” have the burden of
proof, lessened discovery can impact case outcomes.  Reduced system
costs are not beneficial if the tradeoff is substantive justice.  Although
all policy making involves tradeoffs, reducing the amount of discovery
trades cost reductions for access to the truth.33
As Professor Stephen Yeazell pointed out in his comments on the
rule proposals that became the December 2015 amendments:
The asymmetrical limits will be most likely to have an adverse effect
on cases involving claims against large institutions—public or pri-
vate.  Such cases will often involve information critical for the de-
velopment of the claim that lies only in the hands of the defendant,
information that frequently can be garnered only with the use of the
full array of discovery tools. . . .  [I]n a legal system that prides itself
on access to justice and good fact-finding, it is important not to
30. Discovery Order (D. Md.), reprinted in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 197, 198
(Nov. 7–8, 2013) (emphasis added), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15485/download.
31. LCJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 56. R
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 amendments (“Recognizing
the authority does not imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice. Courts and
parties should continue to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of respond-
ing.”).  In this sense, the Rules Committees have stopped far short of the sea change requested
by corporate interest groups.
33. Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure
System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 994 (2012).
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stack the deck against such claimants—as I believe many of the pro-
posed amendments do.34
III. WHY THE PREFERENCE FOR LIMITS? THE ROLE OF SCOTUS
It is not easy for the Supreme Court to directly influence discovery
policy.  Decisions about discovery issues are rarely reviewable.  They
are mostly interlocutory orders35 and only rarely make it to appellate
courts through the appeal of a collateral contempt order (generally
when a claim of privilege has been rejected)36 or occasionally through
a writ of mandamus.37  It would be extraordinarily unusual for an is-
sue of proportional cost to come before the Court.  But there are at
least two ways in which the Court can have an indirect impact on the
evolution of discovery practices: (1) through use of the Chief Justice’s
power to appoint the members of the Advisory and Standing Commit-
tees that make the rules; and (2) through its discourse on discovery
and related doctrines.
A. Appointing Committee Members
Professors Steven Burbank and Sean Farhang have documented a
significant shift in the composition of the federal rulemaking commit-
tees during the last several decades.  They note that
beginning in 1971, when a succession of Chief Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents have chosen committee members, the com-
mittee shifted toward being dominated by federal judges, that those
appointments shifted in favor of judges appointed by Republican
Presidents, that practitioner appointments shifted toward corporate
and defense practitioners, and that the committee’s proposals be-
came increasingly anti-plaintiff (and hence anti-private
enforcement).38
The current chair of the Advisory Committee is a judge who is enthu-
siastic about discovery limits,39 and a majority of the Standing Com-
34. Letter from Stephen C. Yeazell, David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Distinguished Professor
of Law Emeritus, to Jeffrey S. Sutton & Colleagues, Comm. on Rule of Practice & Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 2 (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/content-
Streamer?documentId=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0342&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=
attachment&contentType=pdf.
35. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (holding that a pre-
judgment disclosure order does not qualify for an immediate appeal).
36. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
37. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
38. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 3, at 1159. R
39. For example, Advisory Committee Chair Judge David Campbell’s standard case-manage-
ment order sets presumptive limits of twenty-five for both document requests and requests for
admission, neither of which are subject to limits in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Case Management Order at 1 (D. Az.), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judge-
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mittee’s and Advisory Committee’s judges responsible for the 2015
discovery amendments were appointed by Republican Presidents.
Many of them also served as law clerks to Justices appointed by Re-
publican Presidents.  The increased predominance of judges may itself
be significant.  Some scholars posit that a number of factors have
caused the judiciary to be increasingly politicized and that, on aver-
age, judges are more politically conservative than lawyers.40
To the extent that the lawyers (and judges before they were judges)
tended to represent corporate clients, one should also be concerned
that they have come to identify with those clients in a way that colors
their judgment about the benefits and burdens of litigation.  For ex-
ample, Professor Robert Gordon suggests:
In recent years many lawyers have taken on the values of and
completely identified with their business clients, some of whom see
law as an enemy or a pesky nuisance.  Such lawyers say things like,
“Helping our clients is good because they create wealth, innovation,
and jobs; while their adversaries, the people we help them fight,
small-minded vindictive bureaucrats and greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers,
create nothing and destroy innovation and enterprise.  We help our
clients work around the constraints on their autonomy and wealth-
maximizing activities.”41
In a similar vein, Professors Marc Galanter and William Henderson
argue that the decreased stability of the tie between law firms and
corporate clients, along with increased competition within large law
firms, has led to very instrumental lawyer roles that focus above all on
satisfying clients’ wishes.42
One need not claim a conscious political agenda behind rules that
tend to favor business interests.  The judicial and practitioner mem-
bers of the Advisory and Standing Committees share something per-
haps more influential: a common background and experience as
orders/DGC%20Case%20Management%20Order%20with%20blanks.pdf.  He also made com-
ments like this in preparation for the Duke Conference: “[T]he point of the 2010 Conference is
to think about possible solutions to what everyone seems to agree is too much and too expensive
discovery, and so I throw it out for consideration.” PAUL W. GRIMM & ELIZABETH J.
CABRASER, THE STATE OF DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES 31 (2011) (quoting Judge
Campbell) (recommending hard numeric limits on discovery devices), http://www.nycla.org/
PDF/Winning%20Cases%20in%20Federal%20Court%20-%2006.16.14%20-%202.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The
Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives To Politicize the Judiciary 16 (Harvard John F. Ken-
nedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP15-001, 2015),
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=9544&type=
WPN.
41. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (2003).
42. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation
of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1907–13 (2008).
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lawyers.  The judges, before they were judges, and the practitioners on
the Rules Committees tend to come from elite law firms whose pri-
mary clients are large corporations.  Even the lawyer–members who
do mostly plaintiff-side litigation operate in the rarified world of com-
plex litigation—where discovery may be extensive and high stakes
make it unlikely to be significantly affected by proportionality limits.
The following chart contains basic information about the members of
the committees that approved the 2015 discovery rule amendments.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
(STANDING COMMITTEE)43
Nominator or
Member Employer Other
Judge Jeffrey George W. Bush Law clerk for Justice Scalia; formerly
Sutton (6th Cir.) practiced at Jones Day
James M. Cole, Barack Obama Formerly practiced at Bryan Cave
Deputy Attorney
General (ex
officio)
Dean C. Colson Colson Hicks Law clerk for Justice Rehnquist
Eidson
Judge Brent E. Appointed to the Bonica/Woodruff Campaign Finance
Dickson (Ind. Indiana Supreme Score indicates conservative
Supreme Court) Court in 1986 ideological leaning
Roy T. Englert, Jr. Robbins Russell Partner at a litigation boutique whose
Englert Orseck clients include numerous Fortune 500
Untereiner & companies, financial institutions,
Sauber hedge funds, defense contractors,
technology companies, and major
accounting firms
Gregory Garre Latham & Watkins Law clerk for Justice Rehnquist;
former U.S. Solicitor General
Judge Neil George W. Bush Law clerk for Justice White-Kennedy;
Gorsuch (10th mother was President Reagan’s
Cir.) Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator
Judge Susan P. Bill Clinton Previously an Oregon state court
Graber (9th Cir.) judge
43. Committee membership changes as terms expire and people filling designated slots
change jobs.  In addition, the proposals that became the December 2015 discovery amendments
were considered over the course of multiple years.  The official charts of committee membership
generally reflect membership as of October 1 but are sometimes revised.  The charts in the text
for the Rules Committees reflect those listed in either 2012 or 2013 (or both). COMMITTEES ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CHAIRS AND REPORTERS (2012 & 2013), http://www.us
courts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/past-members-rules-commit
tees.
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Justice Wallace Originally Current partner at Alexander Dubose
Jefferson (Tex. S. appointed by Jefferson Townsend
Ct.) Former Governor
Rick Perry (R)
Dean David Levi George H.W. Bush Law clerk for Justice Powell; Dean,
(former judge) Duke Law School; former judge for
the Eastern District of California
Judge Patrick George W. Bush Former Law Professor at Notre Dame
Schiltz (D. Minn.) University and the University of St.
Thomas
Judge Amy J. St. George W. Bush Formerly practiced at Davis Polk
Eve (N.D. Ill.)
Larry D. Executive Vice Formerly practiced at King &
Thompson President, Pepsico Spaulding; Former Deputy Attorney
General under George W. Bush
Judge Richard C. George W. Bush Former Associate Justice of the N.Y.
Wesley (2d Cir.) Court of Appeals (appointed by Gov.
Pataki)
Judge Jack George W. Bush Former Senior Vice President and
Zouhary (N.D. General Counsel at S.E. Johnson
Ohio) Companies
ADVISORY COMMITTEE44
Nominator or
Member Employer Other
Judge David George W. Bush Law clerk for Justice Rehnquist
Campbell (Chair)
(D. Ariz.)
John M. Barkett Shook, Hardy & Practices in the areas of commercial
Bacon litigation, environmental litigation,
and international alternative dispute
resolution; e-discovery expertise
Elizabeth Cabraser Lief, Cabraser, Court-appointed lead, co-lead, or class
Heimann & counsel in over eighty federal multi-
Bernstein district and state coordinated
proceedings
Stuart F. Delery Department of Law clerk for Justice O’Connor
Justice Acting
Associate Attorney
General
Judge Paul S. George W. Bush Formerly practiced at Obermayer
Diamond (E.D. Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel
Pa.)
Judge Robert George W. Bush Formerly practiced at Mayer Brown
Michael Dow Jr.
44. Id.
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Parker C. Folse Susman Godfrey Law clerk for Justice Rehnquist;
antitrust and patent litigator
representing both plaintiffs and
defendants
Judge Paul W. Barack Obama Former U.S. Magistrate Judge
Grimm (D. Md.) (2006–2012)
Peter D. Keisler Sidley Austin LLP Law clerk for Justice Kennedy;
cofounder of The Federalist Society
Robert H. Klonoff Professor and Formerly practiced at Jones Day
former Dean,
Lewis & Clark
Law School
Judge John G. Bill Clinton Law clerk for Justice Stewart;
Koeltl (S.D.N.Y.) formerly practiced at Debevoise &
Plimpton
Judge Scott M. Barack Obama Former dean at the University of
Matheson, Jr. (with support from Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law
(10th Cir.) Orrin Hatch)
Judge Michael George W. Bush Law clerk for Justice Powell
Mosman (D. Or.)
Judge David E. Initially appointed Law clerk for Justice Scalia; formerly
Nahmias (Ga. S. by Republican practiced at Hogan & Hartson
Ct.) Governor George
Ervin “Sonny”
Perdue III
Judge Solomon Bill Clinton Former Assistant States Attorney;
Oliver, Jr. (N.D. former professor at Cleveland-
Ohio) Marshall College of Law
Judge Gene E. K. George W. Bush Former general counsel at Duane
Pratter (E.D. Pa.) Morris LLP
As a group, these Committee members are likely to have overexper-
ienced that small sliver of litigation in which discovery costs are ex-
tremely high.  The FJC’s study of discovery costs prepared for the
Duke Conference, which was mentioned supra, found a correlation
between those costs and lawsuit stakes, lawsuit processing time, law-
suit complexity, and representation by larger law firms45—all of which
are qualities apt to be common in the litigation experience of the
members of the Rules Committees.  As Professor Linda Mullenix has
pointed out, empirical studies of discovery have consistently shown
that “complex, high-stakes litigation, handled by big firms with corpo-
45. EMORY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1 (Mar. 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1
.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf.
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rate clients, are the cases most likely to involve the problematic dis-
covery that skews the discovery debate.”46
B. Signaling Desired Outcomes
Although the Supreme Court decides few discovery cases, it has
nevertheless sent clear signals that it sees little value in discovery.  A
search for discussions of discovery in Supreme Court cases from the
date John Roberts became Chief Justice yielded a few examples.47
Most noteworthy was the dismissive treatment of discovery in the
pleading cases, Twombly and Iqbal.  Both cases rejected the concept
that judicial case management could sufficiently cabin the presumed
burden of discovery.  Citing a nonempirical article by (now) Judge
Frank Easterbrook, the majority in Twombly stated:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitle-
ment to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discov-
ery process through “careful case management,” given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side.  And it is self-evident that the
problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of
evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid instruc-
tions to juries,” the threat of discovery expense will push cost-con-
scious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.  Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require alle-
gations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope
to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases
with no “‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will
reveal relevant evidence’” to support a [Sherman Act] claim.48
Iqbal followed suit, quoting the first sentence of the Twombly excerpt
above and also referring to the “burdens of discovery.”49  Other men-
tions of discovery include a comment that the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act aimed to limit “vexatious discovery requests”50
because extensive discovery would “allow plaintiffs with weak claims
to extort settlements from innocent companies.”51  Further, Justices
Kennedy and Alito’s dissent in a 2010 case expresses a fear that the
46. Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 683, 683 (1998).
47. Research Memorandum from Christopher Cornell to author (Nov. 1, 2014) (on file with
author).  John Roberts became Chief Justice on September 29, 2005.
48. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (second alteration in original) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
347 (2005)); see id. at 560 n.6 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 638–39 (1989)).
49. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559).
50. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
51. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008).
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costs of discovery and litigation would force settlement even absent
fault or injury.52  There are no majority opinions during this time pe-
riod that praise the role of discovery in any way.
The Court is not the only institution sending signals to the Rules
Committees.  Congress has tried to influence the direction of the
rules.  For example:
[I]n December 2011, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee held a hearing on the “Costs and Burdens of Civil Discov-
ery.”  Before the next meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, the Chairman of this subcommittee wrote to the judges who
head the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure expressing hope that the commit-
tees “will recommend enacting rule reforms to address the principal
concerns discussed at the hearing.”53
Another method for nudging Committee action is the actual introduc-
tion of legislation.  The Chairs of the Advisory and Standing Commit-
tees have recently tried to fend off congressional proposals54 to enact
legislation that proposes sharp discovery limits and other procedural
roadblocks for patent litigation.55
The Chief Justice and SCOTUS majority, then—with a little help
from Congress—can, through the nomination process and the power
of suggestion, indicate to rulemakers a desired direction for procedu-
ral choices.  The Advisory Committee, however, has a fair degree of
independence and a process that allows transparent input from a wide
array of sources.  On this discovery rules package in particular, the
Advisory Committee heard from over 100 witnesses and received
more than 2,300 comments, which the Reporter summarized for the
Committee.  Why has this Band of Experts tended to give more
52. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 612 (2010)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1723 (footnote omitted) (quoting Letter from Rep. Trent Franks, R
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Mark R. Kravitz,
Chairman, U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, and David G.
Campbell, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory Comm. (Mar. 21, 2012)) (citing Costs and Burden of
Civil Discovery: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 112th Cong. (2011)).
54. See Todd Ruger, Judges Warn Congress About Patent Bill Provisions, BLT: BLOG LEGAL
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/11/judges-warn-con
gress-about-patent-bill-provisions.html.
55. This phenomenon is not unique to the Roberts Court.  Before the 2000 rule amendments,
a former Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee warned: “[W]hen interests come to
the Hill, like the business community, or the trial bar, and say you should look at this, they will
look at it. . . .  So they’re definitely going to be looking over your shoulder . . . because people
outside the Hill are going to be sure they do.”  Thornburg, supra note 8, at 261 (first alteration in R
original) (quoting Mark Gitenstein, who was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee when the Civil Justice Reform Act was adopted).
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credence to stories of disproportionate discovery costs?  The next two
Parts of this Article point to some sociological and psychological
forces that strongly reinforce a tendency to distrust and limit
discovery.
IV. MEDIA DEPICTIONS: DEVALUING LITIGATION
All of us, including the members of the Rulemaking Committees,
have been living in a society drenched with accounts of litigation.
These accounts, inadvertently and on purpose, contribute to a mis-
perception of the role of lawsuits in the U.S. legal system.  News sto-
ries emphasize dramatic and bizarre suits, and advocacy groups
wanting to influence legislators, voters, judges, and juries have carried
out a very effective decades-long public relations campaign attacking
plaintiffs and their lawyers.  In a process referred to as “social produc-
tion of knowledge,” when people hear something often enough, they
believe it to be true.56  If they have been exposed to these campaigns,
members of the public “know” that litigation is slow and expensive,
often frivolous, and brought primarily to benefit lawyers rather than
clients.  Although members of the Rules Committees are more sophis-
ticated than the average citizen in their understanding of litigation,
they cannot help but be affected by this pervasive portrayal.
A. Stories and Reports
In a world in which news outlets fight for attention, it is not surpris-
ing that large verdicts are more likely to be reported than small ones,
that plaintiff victories are more likely to be reported than defense ver-
dicts, and that cases with odd facts will get more attention than a plain
vanilla claim.  Professor Galanter has documented these tendencies
and the ways in which media coverage skews public perception of the
legal system.57  Others have also researched this phenomenon.  For
example, Professor Oscar Chase compared New York Times and New
York Newsday coverage of personal injury litigation with the actual
flow of litigation reflected in the New York Jury Verdict Reporter over
a six-year period of time.  He found that the trials that made the news
56. See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & John C. Kilwein, The Future of the West Virginia Judiciary:
Problems and Policy Options, W. VA. PUB. AFFAIRS REP., Oct. 2007, at 2, 5–6, http://ipa.wvu
.edu/r/download/43223.  Other scholars refer to this phenomenon as using aggressive marketing
to create a pervasive reality that influences the format of ideas covered by U.S. media. See, e.g.,
DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS:  THE NEW WASHINGTON AND
THE RISE OF THINK TANKS 200–07 (1993).
57. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 744–47 (1998).
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had damage awards that were far larger than the average award, and
punitive damages increased the odds of a case being reported.58  The
“McDonald’s Coffee Case” is another example of media attention
spotlighting (and distorting) an unusual case.59
News media trends, however, are only a small part of the picture.
For purposes of this Article, a good place to start is the year 1971 with
the “Powell memo,” written by Justice Powell before he was nomi-
nated to the Supreme Court.60  In this memo, written to the chair of
the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Powell
warned of an attack on the free enterprise system, and he recom-
mended that the Chamber mobilize businesses to counteract the liber-
alism of university social science faculties, monitor television news,
create a flow of conservative scholarly articles, advertise in a way in-
tended to modify public opinion, and selectively target court cases
with business-oriented amicus briefs.61  One can trace the implemen-
tation of the Powell memo over the next four decades in the pervasive
media campaign attacking certain types of litigation.
Some of the narrative is discovery specific.  Only a few years after
Powell wrote his memo, then Chief Justice Warren Burger convened
the Pound Conference to address presumed, but not documented,
problems of cost and delay.  The follow-up report of the ABA called
for discovery rule changes, alleging that discovery could be abused
and used to “escalate the cost of litigation, to delay adjudication un-
duly and to coerce unfair settlements.”62
Politically orchestrated critiques of discovery blossomed in the early
1990s, most dramatically with Vice President Dan Quayle’s Council
on Competitiveness. Quayle’s speech to the ABA claimed that “dis-
58. Id. at 745 (citing Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (1995)).
59. See Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
113, 113 n.9 (2001) (citing Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rest., P.T.S. Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994)) (analyzing the ways in which the institutional practices of
news media, trial procedure, and popular culture transformed the complaint of a badly burned
grandmother into an icon for runaway litigiousness).
60. Not only is it historically significant, but also two of the members of the Rules Committees
clerked for Justice Powell.
61. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Snydor, Chairman, Educ. Comm.,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Arch
ives/PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf.  Subsequently, Justice Powell sounded a warning that still
echoes in the arguments of corporate defense organizations: incremental changes in the discov-
ery rules are insufficient, and only dramatic changes will solve the problems of cost and delay.
See Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
62. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE, re-
printed in 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976).
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covery is 80 percent of the problem,” that it “too often becomes an
instrument of delay and even harassment,” and that unnecessary dis-
covery “can disrupt or put on hold a company’s entire research and
development program.”63  Advisory Committee Chair Judge Paul
Niemeyer rallied the Committee to advocate discovery limits, and he
repeated the 80% claim even while admitting that he knew of no data
to support it—and while the research commissioned by the Commit-
tee contradicted it.64
The antidiscovery narrative is just a piece of the overall campaign to
portray litigation as dysfunctional and paint plaintiffs and their law-
yers as the bad guys.65  The industry campaign to transform the way
Americans think about litigation began in the 1980s.  Insurance com-
panies and industry trade groups brilliantly invoked fundamental cul-
tural images and associated them with individual lawsuits against
corporate defendants.  Thus personal injury claims got blamed for a
litigation “explosion,” involving “skyrocketing” damage awards by
“runaway” juries.  Collectively, these images became a “crisis” in im-
mediate need of a return to “balance.”66
The campaign was bolstered with false or misleading horror stories
and fabricated or misleading numerical data (made more effective
through eye-catching charts and graphs).67  The strategists realized
that the media and the public pay attention to horrific-sounding anec-
dotes with catchy details like psychics, day care centers, and the death
of high school football.  The stories came complete with victims and
villains.  Workers and other plaintiffs were portrayed as whiners who
failed to take personal responsibility for their own problems rather
than injured victims trying to enforce the law and deter misbehavior.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers were an even better scapegoat—portrayed as
greedy parasites trying to make an easy buck by scaring companies
into settling frivolous claims.68
Part of the brilliance of this campaign was its effort to convince
members of the public that they, personally (not just corporations and
63. Reda, supra note 17, at 1096 (quoting Vice President Dan Quayle, Address to the Annual R
Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991)).
64. Thornburg, supra note 8, at 245 n.97 (quoting Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are R
the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 518 (1998)).
65. The following discussion is adapted from Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes,
Lawsuit Climates, and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097,
1098–1100 (2008).
66. See generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM 4–9, 37–51 (1995) (discussing in detail the rhetorical devices used to sway public
opinion).
67. See generally id. at 51–56 (describing the misuse of statistics and visual displays).
68. Id. at 38–39.
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their insurers), were being hurt by litigation.  In 1986, the Insurance
Information Institute launched its initial public relations effort: “We
All Pay the Price.”  A series of vivid print advertisements featured
titles such as  “The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for Babies,” “The Lawsuit
Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports,” and “Even the Clergy Can’t Es-
cape the Lawsuit Crisis.”69  Once again a catchy phrase brought home
the message: everyone is paying a “lawsuit tax,” an increase in the
price of goods and services that exists only because of the cost of de-
fending and insuring against tort litigation and workers’ compensation
claims.  The possibility that the defendant might have prevented the
injuries or that the costs could have been assessed against the share-
holders’ profits is not discussed.
The antilawsuit rhetorical messages were repeated over and over by
business-funded institutes and Fortune 500 companies, and these
messages are now omnipresent in popular culture.  Business execu-
tives themselves may believe the hype—they, too, have been listening
to the campaign for more than thirty years.70  One interesting result is
that CEOs are significantly more likely to believe in the existence of
litigation risk than are their risk managers—the people who deal with
the actual risk data on a day-to-day basis.71  In the context of attacks
on medical malpractice litigation, Professor Tom Baker notes that the
outrage stories are “repeated so often that even the mythmakers for-
get the exaggeration, half truth, and outright misinformation em-
ployed in the service of their greater good.”72
Starting in the early 2000s, a couple of additional organizations
joined the publicity campaign against litigation, most notably the
American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) and the Institute for Le-
gal Reform (ILR), a U.S. Chamber of Commerce entity.  ATRA’s
campaign, which labeled courts as “judicial hellholes,” began in 2002,
and it falls squarely within this tradition of belittling litigation—sug-
gesting that there is no “benefit” in a cost–benefit analysis of lawsuit
expenses.  Judicial Hellholes, they say, are jurisdictions that are “fre-
69. See Even the Clergy Can’t Escape the Lawsuit Crisis, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 69; No One Is
Immune from the Lawsuit Crisis, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1986, at 87; No One Is Immune from the
Lawsuit Crisis, TIME, June 9, 1986, at 32; The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for Babies, NEWSWEEK, June
30, 1986, at 27; The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for Babies, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 67; The Lawsuit
Crisis is Penalizing School Sports, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1986, at 37; The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penal-
izing School Sports, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 25; We All Pay the Price: An Industry Effort To
Reform Civil Justice, INS. REV., Apr. 1986, at 58.
70. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998).
71. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 741–43 (1998).
72. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 22  2-AUG-16 10:02
776 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:755
quently identified by members of the American Tort Reform Associa-
tion (ATRA) and other individuals familiar with litigation.”73  The
reports (which continue today) use ATRA’s collection of anecdotal
information and stories reported in the media to justify each jurisdic-
tion’s hellhole status.  The reports are primarily a collection of seem-
ingly outrageous stories of frivolous claims.  Closer study often shows
the accounts to be partial and misleading,74 but they are vivid and
memorable.
Like ATRA, the ILR is not concerned with basing its “lawsuit cli-
mate” campaign on data that a social scientist would find convincing.
Instead, the ILR hired Harris Interactive, a market research firm, to
poll selected corporate in-house counsel and senior corporate liti-
gators who represent companies with annual revenues of at least $100
million.  The report has a clear, memorable model: the report card.
Lawyers are asked to grade states (A–F) on issues like treatment of
mass torts, punitive damages, noneconomic damages, judges’ imparti-
ality, and juries’ predictability and fairness.75  Discovery is one of the
issues the ILR raised in its surveys.  As the ILR’s website informs
readers:
discovery has developed into one of the most hostile and burden-
some civil litigation procedures in the United States.  Originally de-
signed to prevent trials by ambush and to ensure fairness in
litigation, the process is now routinely abused by plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to burden defendants in hopes of forcing them into a quick,
costly settlement.76
Opinions about a state court system’s discovery rules will thus play a
role in the state’s report card.
The lawsuit climate reports, while not filled with memorable horror
stories, were beautifully produced, full of alarming (yet deceptive)
graphics, and gave the outward appearance of being reliable empirical
data (even though they were essentially opinion polls, and opinions
were included so long as the interviewee claimed to be “somewhat
73. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES at ii (2006), http://www.judicialhel-
lholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2006.pdf.  The first report, in 2002, used a survey of
ATRA members as a basis for its ratings. AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2002), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/
JH2002.pdf.
74. Thornburg, supra note 65, at 1122–32. R
75. HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007: RATING THE STATES 2 (2007), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2007climate_report.pdf.
76. Discovery, U.S. CHAMBER COMM., http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/discov
ery (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
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familiar” with the state in question).  Respondents were also primed
with copies of the prior year’s report card.77
Just as is true of opinion surveys that merely claim that discovery is
too expensive, the story of abusive litigation contained in the public
relations campaigns is not supported by hard data.  Empirical research
conducted by neutral scholars consistently shows that the claims are
false or exaggerated.  Studies of actual reported cases and court statis-
tics—including caseloads, trials, awards, and settlements—show that:
• There is no “litigation explosion,” especially not of product liabil-
ity and medical malpractice claims.78
• In cases that go to trial, plaintiffs win a moderate number of cases
and both mean and median awards are modest.  The same is true
of settlements made “in the shadow” of jury awards.79
• Punitive damages awards are rare, and, even when they do occur,
they are often small in both absolute terms and relative to actual
damages.80
• Many of the oft-repeated horror stories are merely urban myths,
others are distorted through omission of important information,
and some are outrageous claims that were immediately dismissed
by the trial courts.81
• Numbers used to show growth in caseloads assume, rather than
prove, causation and often ignore other important variables.
Worse, some are merely fabricated and then repeated until they
seem to be factual.82
77. See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair,
and Bad for Business 5–9 (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 09-029, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470872.
78. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1103–09 (1996).  In fact, only a very small percentage of grievances result in litigation. See David
M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 85 (1983).
79. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical
Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 437 (1996) (discussing jury verdicts in various types of
cases); see Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875,
1898–1901 (2006) (noting that an insurance payout database reflected generally modest pay-
ments in death cases).  Results in the courts of appeals are even less friendly to plaintiffs. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 948–50 (analyzing a
database of all federal trials and appeals since 1988 and concluding that that a defendant’s ad-
vantage exists, probably because of appellate judges’ misperceptions that trial level adjudicators
are pro-plaintiff).
80.  Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1411–17 (1993); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Prod-
ucts Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36–73, 38 tbl.3
(1992).
81. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 726–33 (1998).
82. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 66, at 57–58. R
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Despite the efforts of social scientists to debunk pseudo-factual claims
with statistics, the stories stick.  Empirical data do not capture the im-
agination, and some of the most important issues (such as the benefits
of litigation) cannot easily be measured.  For example, can you, with-
out looking back, remember the statistics in Part II of this Article?
The stories, on the other hand, are both vivid and memorable.  At
their most powerful, they tap into deeply embedded cultural beliefs
(like individualism) and fears (like loss of control).
If people believe that litigation has this little value, small wonder
that calls for proportional costs resonate.  When procedure rule
amendments are proposed, one crucial question is always whether
there is “a problem that needs to be solved.”  Because the public has
been bombarded with suggestions that lawsuits have no benefit, even
minimal expenses are too high and hopes of cost savings feel compel-
ling.  The “worrisome” cases experienced by Advisory Committee
members appear to them to be part of a larger trend.
B. Pictures
For more than forty years, then, we have been bombarded by a
compelling but misleading visceral narrative.  Repeatedly confronted
with emotive words (such as crisis, explosion, and skyrocketing) as
well as dramatic stories, we remember and believe that litigation is
often frivolous and largely out of control.  But that’s not all—the insti-
tutions creating the narrative understand the value of imagery and
have employed it to add layers of drama and memorability to the anti-
litigation campaign.
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There are several types of images that aim for an emotional re-
sponse.  Consider Figure 1, depicting an image of lawyer greed from
an ILR advertisement, which appeared in USA Today and was also
used as a billboard:83
FIGURE 1
83. Don’t You Think This Billboard Is Ugly and Obnoxious?, EVAN SCHAEFFER’S LEGAL
UNDERGROUND BLOG (Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.legalunderground.com/2006/04/the_obnox
ious_b.html.
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Images have also dramatized the claim that lawsuits are taking money
out of the pockets of all citizens.  No retirement for you or college for
your kids—you have to pay that lawsuit tax as depicted in Figure 2:
FIGURE 2
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Further, a number of images portray plaintiffs playing a game of
chance with potentially gigantic, unpredictable, and undeserved re-
wards as in the Jackpot Justice report cover depicted in Figure 3:84
FIGURE 3
84. See Baker, Kritzer, & Vidmar on Jackpot Justice, PAC. RESEARCH INST. (July 4, 2008),
http://www.pacificresearch.org/article/baker-kritzer-vidmar-on-jackpot-justice (providing the
cover image of the report).  See Tom Baker et al., Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System:
Thinking Beyond Junk Science 1–19 (William Mitchell Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 95, 2008), for an academic debunking of the “Jackpot Justice” report.
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The succession of covers for ATRA’s “Judicial Hellholes” reports are
also noteworthy.  The very first, which appeared in 2002, portrayed an
unusual Lady Justice, a courthouse frieze, and a riflescope bullseye.85
FIGURE 4
The bandana and modern clothing on the judicial icon is very unu-
sual—this statue from the federal courthouse in the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands is, in fact, an almost unique depiction of “justice” as a person of
color.86  Is a subliminal attack on minority jurors intended?  Later
Hellholes reports did more with the hellfire theme; the 2007 cover was
particularly dramatic:
85. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, supra note 73. R
86. For more information and a digital image of the statue, see Lady of Justice, YALE L. SCH.:
LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIB., http://documents.law.yale.edu/representing-justice/lady-justice-0
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
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FIGURE 5
Visuals of these types reinforce the anti-litigation narrative.  They are
dramatic, memorable, and strongly underline the print advertise-
ment’s messages: litigation is dangerous, unfair, bad for business, and
bad for the reader.  And most members of the Rules Committees have
heard the stories and seen the images since they were children.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 30  2-AUG-16 10:02
784 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:755
V. THINKING FAST ON THE RULES COMMITTEES
Members of the Band of Experts, when deciding what to do about
the procedure rules, are making decisions that require the calculation
of probabilities: How common is disproportionately expensive discov-
ery?  They are also predicting the likelihood of future events: What
impact would rule changes have on federal civil suits?  Because they
are human beings with human brains, both judges and lawyers on the
Rules Committees will use well-documented methods of cognition
when making those predictions.  They will bring to the decisions their
own personal and professional experiences, the lenses through which
they see the world.  It is unlikely that doing so will involve a purely
logical deduction from first principles.
Cognitive psychologists use a number of different labels to describe
how humans think, but they recognize distinct roles for intuition and
deliberation.87  Intuitive processes (sometimes called System 1) oper-
ate quickly, utilize heuristics, are relatively effortless, and are suscepti-
ble to emotional influences.  “System 1 is radically insensitive to both
the quality and quantity of the  information that give rise to impres-
sions and intuitions.”88  Deliberative processes (System 2), on the
other hand, move more slowly because they require conscious work
and the application of rules.  The two systems interact, and at times
the intuitive inferences, which are automatically gathered, affect more
deliberative decisions in a number of ways.  Despite the intervention
of System 2 thinking, the influence of System 1 rarely ceases.89  In a
recent bestselling book summarizing a lifetime of research, Nobel
Prize winning economist Daniel Kahneman described this duality as
“Thinking, Fast and Slow.”
The “fast” intuitive thinking is essential for survival and often accu-
rate.  However, it can easily lead us unwittingly astray, and there are
contexts in which “slow” deliberation needs to become conscious of
its fast partner’s weaknesses and override it.  I am concerned that the
Rules Committee members think of themselves as expert logicians be-
cause that self-image does not adequately account for the heuristic
biases to which we all succumb, and the homogeneity of the Advisory
and Standing Committees’ political and professional experience exac-
erbates the problem. Rulemaking choices that consistently reflect the
87. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 6 (2007) (discussing the judicial decision-making process); see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011) (discussing the mental process of impression, intuition, and
decision).
88. KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 86. R
89. Id. at 85–86.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL214.txt unknown Seq: 31  2-AUG-16 10:02
2016] THE ANTI-LITIGATION NARRATIVE 785
influence of intuition over deliberation will lead to flawed policy
choices.
A. Availability Bias
Professor Kahneman and his collaborator, Amos Tversky, consid-
ered what people do when they want to estimate the size of a category
or the frequency of some event.90  They discovered that when exam-
ples are easy to retrieve from memory, people will estimate that the
category is large or the event frequent.  Fluent recall can provide help-
ful information because, “in general, frequent events are easier to re-
call or imagine than infrequent ones.”91  Unfortunately, the
availability of examples is a partial and unreliable guide.  There are
many factors other than frequency that can make it easy to remember
examples.  They include media coverage of relevant examples,92 per-
sonal experiences (more memorable than general information), pic-
tures (more memorable than mere words), and vivid examples (more
memorable than statistics).93  In addition, people are more likely to be
influenced by ease of retrieval when they are “engaged in another ef-
fortful task at the same time,” and “if they are (or are made to feel)
powerful.”94
B. Confirmation Bias
The availability heuristic goes hand in hand with another way in
which our minds operate, generally referred to as “confirmation bias.”
This heuristic is defined as “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in
ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis
in hand.”95  There are times when a person deliberately seeks out in-
formation to support a position she has taken.  The kind of confirma-
tion bias that can distort judgment, however, operates as part of
System 1 (intuitive) thinking on a less conscious level.  Confirmation
bias leads us to find and interpret information in a way that supports
preexisting hypotheses and to avoid information or interpretations
that support alternate possibilities.  It can also take the form of giving
90. Id. at 129; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judg-
ing Frequency and Probability, in 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973), http://people.umass
.edu/biep540w/pdf/Tversky%20availability.pdf.
91. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 90, at 164. R
92. See Shanto Iyengar, The Accessibility Bias in Politics: Television News and Public Opinion,
2 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 1 (1990).
93. KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 130. R
94. Id. at 135.
95. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REV. GEN’L PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
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greater weight to information supporting a position one has taken or
remembering that supporting information more readily than informa-
tion that disconfirms the belief.  In the political arena, it has been sug-
gested that once a government has committed itself to a policy, it
subsequently focuses on information that supports the choice.  This is
particularly common in situations that are inherently complex and am-
biguous—those that are characterized by interactions among numer-
ous variables and in which the cause and effect relationships are
obscure.96
There is some disagreement about whether confirmation bias is a
motivational or cognitive problem.  Both may play a role, but the op-
eration of associative memory is clearly at work.  Professor Kahneman
points to the research of psychologist Daniel Gilbert regarding the
operation of believing and unbelieving as a way to understand a mech-
anism of cognitive bias.  Understanding a statement, says Gilbert,
must begin with an attempt to believe it—“you must first know what
the idea would mean if it were true.”97  The initial effort to understand
and believe is an automatic System 1 process. Unbelieving, on the
other hand, requires thought.
How does that testing work?  It turns out that it matters how the
question being tested is framed because the brain searches for con-
firming evidence to test a hypothesis.  As Kahneman explained:
When asked, “Is Sam friendly?” different instances of Sam’s behav-
ior will come to mind than would if you had been asked “Is Sam
unfriendly?” . . .  Contrary to the rules of philosophers of science,
who advise testing hypotheses by trying to refute them, people . . .
seek data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they cur-
rently hold.98
Consider, then, how availability bias and confirmation bias can act to-
gether: a person determines whether she believes something is proba-
ble based on how easy it is to remember supportive examples.  That
ease of recall is affected by personal experience as well as other fac-
tors that make memories more vivid and accessible.  Then, once a be-
lief is formed, she tends to seek out, pay attention to, and give more
weight to information that is consistent with the belief.  Letting go of
initial impressions is not impossible, but it is really hard.
96. Id. at 191–92.
97. KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 81. R
98. Id.
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C. Cognitive Bias and the Band of Experts
When deciding whether to recommend rule changes, the members
of the Advisory and Standing Committees make judgments about the
existence and severity of problems in the conduct of civil litigation.
They are also predicting that the rules as amended would decrease the
frequency or severity of discovery problems without creating more
significant new problems.  In this most recent round of amendments,
the Rules Committees were presented both with empirical data indi-
cating that most cases proceed efficiently and with a chorus of com-
plaints in the form of opinion surveys.  They were told that effective
enforcement of substantive law requires effective discovery, but they
were also told that the cost of litigation hurts U.S. businesses.  In
choosing to adopt significant changes to the discovery rules in ways
intended to decrease the amount of discovery, they chose to believe
the complaints and discount the fear of decreased enforcement.  Are
there ways in which the availability and confirmation bias heuristics
help explain that choice?
When a Committee member considers whether the costs of discov-
ery exceed its benefits, a number of things are apt to come quickly to
mind and thereby increase the impression that abuse is a significant
phenomenon.  Many flow from the masterful use of heuristics in the
public relations campaign described in Part IV supra.  Its narrative
both undercuts the value of litigation and exaggerates its costs.  The
volume alone is impressive, stretching across more than three decades.
Consider the ways in which the anti-litigation narrative has been
structured to be particularly “available”:
• Extensive media coverage (achieved through paid advertising),
creation of media opportunities through the issuance of annual
“reports” with catchy names, promotion of coverage of outrage
stories,99 and the media’s own tendency to cover the dramatic and
unusual.
• The parade of “loony lawsuits” provides vivid stories that are ex-
tremely memorable.  From websites to press releases to Judicial
Hellholes reports, bizarre facts combined with false or misleading
procedural accounts (that are far less captivating in any case)
bring to mind what seem to be ridiculous lawsuits and make them
seem like examples of the background norm rather than
aberrations.
99. The organizations promoting the negative view of litigation sometimes enhance awareness
by acting as “‘availability entrepreneurs,’ individuals or organizations who work to ensure a
continuous flow of worrying news.” KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 142.  If successful, a combina- R
tion of forces can result in an “availability cascade,” which can create intense pressure on
policymakers to act on the resulting fears.
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• The campaign personalizes the narrative by threatening the audi-
ence’s own financial well being, adding emotion and making the
message more like a personal experience.
• Even numbers, although normally less memorable, have been
dramatized with emotional content (“you pay a $3400 annual tort
tax”) and exaggerated rhetorical flourish (“80% of the cost of liti-
gation is discovery”).
• All of these tools have been reinforced with visuals whether they
depict the drama of hellfire and brimstone, misleading charts,100
or pictures of the cookie jar taking money from a family’s savings.
The complaints about the cost of discovery are also tied to memora-
ble sources: the leaders of the most powerful corporations on the
planet, the partners of the most prominent Wall Street law firms, and
extremely powerful political figures.  ATRA is funded by major cor-
porations, as is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s ILR.101  The Ameri-
can College of Trial Lawyers and the ABA weighed in with opinion
polls full of complaints.  The witnesses at the committee’s public hear-
ings, and those who provided written comments on the proposed
amendments, include these major players.  The Chief Justice who ap-
pointed the committee members has urged them to act on the com-
plaints voiced at the Duke Conference, and Congress is breathing
down their necks with complaints about litigation and threats to enact
legislation.  That level of incessant complaints from prominent citizens
is easy to remember.
These general societal examples are, in all probability, reinforced by
the committee members’ own professional experiences.  Although
empirical studies have always shown that most litigation proceeds at
reasonable cost, there is that very small percent of litigation with high
costs, which is also a repeat finding of empirical research.102  From the
FJC’s closed case study, we know something about what those cases
look like: they are complex, high stakes, highly contentious, and tend
to involve larger law firms and hourly billing.103  They are, in short,
the kind of cases that the elite lawyers on the Rules Committees are
apt to litigate.  They, or their firms, have been involved in the expen-
sive cases (indeed, it is their hourly bills that form a large portion of
the costs)—and so when searching their memories to answer the ques-
100. See Thornburg, supra note 65, at 1100 (providing examples). R
101. For a partial list of ATRA members, see Sample List of ATRA Members, AM. TORT
REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about/sample-members (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).  For
more information about ILR funding, see SAM JEWELER, PUB. CITIZEN, THE GILDED CHAMBER
3, 3 fig.1 (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.citizen.org/documents/us-chamber-of-commerce-funders-
dominated-by-large-corporations-report.pdf.
102. See Rule Memorandum, supra note 15, at 268. R
103. Lee & Willging, supra note 16, at 784. R
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tion “does discovery cost too much” they are apt to recall their own
experiences as vivid examples of high cost.  From the perspective of a
corporate client that believes a claim against it to be nonmeritorious,
any cost of defense is not just high but too high.  Judicial members of
the Rules Committees came mostly from that elite type of practice.
As judges, their focus is not with the average, self-monitoring lawsuit,
but instead with those cases that involve repeated disputes about
scope, privilege, and e-discovery.  In both cases, the sample provided
by personal experience is atypical of the norm; the availability heuris-
tic jumps from ease of access to personal experience to a conclusion
that excessive discovery costs are normal.104
A combination of societal messages, political loyalties, and personal
professional anecdotes, then, may lead Rules Committee members to
intuitively believe that litigation often has no social benefit, that dis-
covery’s costs frequently exceed its value, and that the current rules
have not been effective in eliminating those problems.  Then confir-
mation bias kicks in, and when competing information and arguments
are presented, there is a tendency to disregard them.  Opinion surveys,
testimony from law firms and corporations claiming that discovery
costs are too high, and public comments on the proposed rules sup-
porting a decrease in discovery supported a belief that members al-
ready held personally.  They supported a course of action to which the
Advisory Committee had already committed.  And, as such, they had
more impact than arguments or evidence to the contrary.
The Advisory and Standing Committees’ use of survey data may
actually be stacking availability effects.  The most common type of
submission to the Advisory Committee attempting to document the
existence of discovery abuse came in the form of opinion surveys.
And what are those survey responses but a collection of the impact of
association bias on other people?  Assuming again that the survey re-
sponses are genuinely believed and not just instrumental arguments to
secure desired law changes, they are still composed of opinions gener-
ated by the same kind of mental processes described in this Article.
Those lawyers were also exposed to the dominant anti-litigation nar-
rative; many of the survey respondents also had significant defense-
oriented practices or were members of associations of corporate
lawyers.
104. Although members of the Advisory Committee clearly were intellectually aware of data
substantiating the high proportion of civil suits that function well and the very low rate of “wor-
risome” cases, the close fit between the vivid public narrative and their personal experiences
may also have led to “base rate neglect.”  Guthrie et al., supra note 87, at 22.  Their own specific R
anecdotes caused them to disregard data about low costs in most cases.
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In addition to availability, confirmation bias may well have played a
role in the way attorneys responded to survey questions.  For example,
the ABA Litigation Section’s survey instrument phrased some of the
inquiries in ways that would summon examples of litigation problems.
Using a Likert scale questionnaire, survey respondents were asked to
agree or disagree with statements like these:
• “There are too many Rules.”
• “The Rules are too complex.”
• “The Rules, as a whole, are internally inconsistent.”
• “The Rules are enforced in an inconsistent manner, even within a
single district.”
• “Notice pleading has become a problem, because extensive dis-
covery is required to narrow the claims and defenses.”
• “Fact pleading can narrow the scope of discovery.”
• “Frivolous claims and defenses are asserted more frequently than
they were five years ago.”
• “Discovery is abused in almost every case.”
• “Counsel use discovery as a tool to force settlement.”
• “Judges do not enforce Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to limit discovery.”105
Try it yourself.  The framing of these issues will tend to make you
search for memories that make the statements true.  And although
that is not the only possible response (some survey respondents did, in
fact, disagree with the statements), it is likely that your brain first took
you to positive examples.  If the respondents held negative views of
the costs of discovery, opinion polls contained few prompts that would
cause them to search for disconfirmatory concrete information like
the actual cost of discovery in specific cases.
VI. CONCLUSION: A BROADER BAND?
As Professor Kahneman and others have argued, it is not easy to
kick System 2 into gear to tame the intuitive leaps of System 1.  Nev-
ertheless, it is not impossible to nurture slower thinking and greater
awareness of one’s own heuristic tendencies.  During the rule amend-
ment process described in this Article, the Advisory Committee modi-
fied its initial proposals slightly in response to outside critique.
Overall, however, the package of amendments is the product of a
105. ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED RE-
PORT (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/aba-section-litigation-survey-civil-
practice.
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group of people whose similar backgrounds allowed too many inputs
to go unheeded.
Structurally, some measures could be taken to restore greater bal-
ance to the rules process.  One way to improve intuitive results is to
become more aware of situations in which errors are likely.  Even if
intuition dominates decision making, committee membership that is
more experientially and philosophically diverse would produce a more
varied set of intuitions and biases, a situation in which people with
competing visions will become more aware that theirs is not univer-
sally held.  If members of a group share a bias, the aggregation of
judgments will not reduce error.106  The Advisory and Standing Com-
mittees need more political variety: a different ratio of judges to prac-
titioners as well as practitioners from a far wider variety of practices
and client types.
Organizations (such as committees) can also adopt processes more
likely to avoid a rush to judgment.  These can include the use of
“checklists” that force issues to be considered;107 the adoption of sys-
tems in which all members document their thoughts in writing before
the meeting begins so as to maximize the availability of diversity of
knowledge and opinion;108 and an imaginative exercise known as the
premortem.  Premortem works as follows:
[W]hen the organization has almost come to an important decision
but has not formally committed itself, . . . [gather] for a brief session
a group of individuals who are knowledgeable about the decision.
The premise of the session is a short speech: “Imagine that we are a
year into the future.  We implemented the plan as it now exists.  The
outcome was a disaster.  Please take 5 to 10 minutes to write a brief
history of that disaster.”109
Some facets of the rulemaking environment make improved intui-
tion and deliberation more difficult.  As Professor Rachlinski and his
collaborators have noted, intuition improves if a person receives “im-
mediate, high quality feedback about the causes and consequences of
errors.”110  For the Rules Committees, the time lag and complexity of
data collection make it difficult to convincingly document the conse-
quences of prior rule changes, depriving the Committees of corrective
feedback.
Other committee practices already support the use of System 2
thinking.  For example, decisions that are allowed adequate time are
106. KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 84. R
107. See Guthrie et al., supra note 87, at 40–42 (discussing checklists and multifactor tests). R
108. KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 85. R
109. Id. at 264.
110. Guthrie et al., supra note 87, at 33. R
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more likely to encourage deliberation, and the rulemaking process is
not a speedy one.  Similarly, requiring a written opinion justifying a
decision can make deliberation more likely, and proposed rule
amendments come with written reports and Advisory Committee
Notes.111
Nowhere is the current impact of Committee homogeneity more
clear than in the 2015 discovery rule amendments.  Whether deliber-
ately or through the operation of cognitive biases, the amendments
are a gift to institutional defendants.  While ostensibly aimed at the
few cases in which discovery costs are disproportionate, in fact they
have the potential to encourage resistance to discovery and to deprive
litigants of crucial information in ordinary cases.  The amendments
and the Committees’ rationale for the amendments match neither reli-
able data nor the results of past rule amendments.  Instead, they re-
flect a stubborn belief that litigation is too expensive and that that
expense arises out of excessive discovery.  Information to the contrary
was discounted, rejected, or ignored.
The “Band of Experts” concept has understandable appeal to a
group faced with a difficult, politicized task and an ongoing informa-
tion deficit.  The Advisory and Standing Committees would like to be
seen as making wise, neutral decisions.  Ultimately, however, the con-
cept does not fit the role.  Although members are intelligent and ex-
perienced, the committees fall prey to predictable cognitive traps;
their role requires decisions that will affect litigation advantages and
disadvantages.  Procedural expertise, unfortunately, does not come in
a neutral package when normative decisions are made.  We need a
broader Band.
111. Whether those writings were done at a time that they actually guided the process leading
to the decision to recommend the amendments is less clear; it is conceivable that the reporters
use their considerable skills to construct the best available arguments in favor of the recommen-
dations after the decisions have been finalized through a less deliberative process.
